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I. JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2). 
II. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Salt Lake City Planning Commission acted within its lawfully 
delegated powers in granting a conditional use permit to the Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall 
& McCarthy 401(K) Profit Sharing Plan ("Van Cott") to build a planned development on 
the subject property owned by Van Cott. 
Failure to Preserve for Appeal: Appellants Donner Crest Condominium 
Homeowners' Association and Oakcrest Condominium Homeowners' Association 
("Donner Crest") present several arguments for the first time in their brief to this Court. 
Donner Crest's failure to present these arguments prior to this appeal precludes this Court 
from hearing them. As detailed more fully below, Donner Crest failed to preserve the 
issues of whether the Van Cott property is a valid candidate for a PUD, and whether the 
City's PUD provisions are illegal as applied to this case. 
Standard of Appellate Review: If a zoning plan "could promote the general 
welfare; or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general 
welfare, that act should be upheld." Marshall v. Salt Lake City. 141 P.2d 704,709 (Utah 
1943). "A municipality's land use decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference." 
Springville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springyille. 1999 UT 25, If 23, 979 P.2d 
332, 336 (citations omitted). Courts are required to "(a) presume that land use decisions 
and regulations are valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
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capricious, or illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3). "Although section 10-9-1001 
expressly applies only to the district court, the standard for . . . review [by the Court of 
Appeals]... is the same standard established in the Utah Code for the district court's 
review." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City. 997 P.2d 321, 323 n.3 (Utah App. 2000) 
(internal quotations omitted; citations omitted). This Court examines legal conclusions, 
including statutory interpretation, for correctness. See, e.g.. Young v. Salt Lake City 
School Dist.. 2002 UT 64, K 10, 52 P.3d 1230, 1233 (Utah 2002). 
III. IMPORTANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
In addition to the statutes provided by Donner Crest in its brief, Van Cott includes 
the following provisions in Addendum-1 ("Add.-l"): 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-102. Add.-l at 1. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-204. Add.-l at 1. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. Add.-l at 1. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The true dispute in this case centers around whether Salt Lake City's 
comprehensive zoning ordinance (the "Zoning Ordinance") was legally applied in this 
case to grant Van Cott a conditional use permit for its planned development. While 
presenting an informative overview on land use law, Donner Crest fails to present any 
legal argument tending to show that the Planning Commission acted outside the scope of 
its authority, or that the City Council lacked the authority to delegate such power to the 
Planning Commission. Further, Donner Crest's arguments that the Van Cott parcel does 
not qualify for planned development, and that the City's planned development scheme as 
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applied is illegal, are presented for the first time in this case on appeal. As such, this 
Court should not entertain the arguments, but should affirm the decision of the district 
court. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Van Cott generally agrees with the statement of Donner Crest regarding the 
proceedings up to this point, as detailed more fully in Donner Crest's brief. Br. of 
Appellant p. 3-4. 
C. REPLY TO DONNER CREST'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Van Cott assumed only for the limited purposes of the court's ruling on its Motion 
for Summary Judgment that the facts alleged in Donner Crest's Amended Complaint 
were true. R. 168. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In this appeal, Donner Crest argues that the decision of the trial court, which 
affirmed the decisions reached by the Salt Lake City Planning Commission and the Salt 
Lake City Land Use Appeals Board, should be second-guessed. Donner Crest advances a 
variety of broad reasons for this untenable position. Donner Crest's arguments should be 
rejected. 
First, Donner Crest failed to raise all these issues below. Donner Crest's 
arguments that the Van Cott property does not qualify as a planned development and that 
the City's planned development provision is illegal are raised here for the first time. 
These issues should be dismissed out-of-hand by this Court as not properly preserved and 
raised. 
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Second, the actions of the Planning Commission in approving the Van Cott 
planned development application was proper in all respects and was done pursuant to 
statutorily granted powers. The Planning Commission properly granted a conditional use 
pursuant to the purposes and specific provisions of the governing state Act and municipal 
Code. The Planning Commission made detailed findings to which this Court must defer 
with respect to the property in question. Those findings comply with every relevant 
provision of law. The conditional use provisions allow the Planning Commission to 
"change, alter, modify or waive" any provision of the zoning ordinance or the City's 
subdivision regulations to achieve the purposes for which a planned development may be 
approved. The Van Cott property plainly falls within the definition of a planned 
development under the Salt Lake City ordinance. This is not, as Donner Crest argues, 
"illegal spot zoning" as it does not constitute a use classification materially different and 
inconsistent with the surrounding area. 
Finally, Van Cott was not required to obtain a separate variance from the Board of 
Adjustment. The Planning Commission modified the frontage requirement pursuant to its 
lawfully delegated authority in approving a planned development under the zoning 
ordinance. A variance is required if a party seeks to develop property outside the 
strictures of the zoning ordinance. Because the Van Cott planned development was 
authorized by the comprehensive zoning ordinance, a variance was not required. Donner 
Crest provides no governing authority to the contrary to support this indefensible 
position. 
For each of these reasons, the decision below should be affirmed. 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
The Planning Commission's actions in approving the Van Cott planned 
development is proper in all respects. The Van Cott property is a proper candidate for a 
PUD and the Planning Commission acted within its statutorily granted powers in 
approving Van Cott's application for a conditional use permit. 
A. DONNER CREST FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVE FOR 
APPEAL ARGUMENTS WHICH IT NOW ATTEMPTS TO ADVANCE. 
Donner Crest failed to raise issues before the trial court which it now attempts to 
advance in this Court. It is for the first time on appeal that Donner Crest asserts at least 
two arguments: (1) the Van Cott property and project do not qualify as a planned 
development and (2) as applied to the facts of this case, the City's PUD provision is 
illegal. See Br. of Appellant p. 30-37. Such an attempt is not allowed under either the 
Rules of Appellate procedure or Utah case law. 
Courts in Utah have long held that a party "who fails to bring an issue before the 
trial court is generally barred from raising it for the first time on appeal." State v. Irwin. 
924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996). Furthermore, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
require that Donner Crest provide in its brief "citation to the record showing that the issue 
was preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue 
not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. Proc. 24(a)(5)(A) and (B). "[E]ach issue 
presented for review in an appellant's brief must cite to the record, showing that the issue 
was preserved in the trial court or, if it was not preserved, then appellant must set forth 
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the grounds permitting appellate review. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d at 7 n. 2 (citing Utah 
Rule App. Proc. 24(a)). This Court has long held that: 
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring 
the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court 
an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. "Issues not raised in the 
trial court in timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding [the 
appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal." 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm., 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App. 1997) (bracket in 
original) (citing Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602, 604 n.l (Utah App. 1993)). 
Utah courts have set forth three specific factors for determining whether an issue 
was preserved for appeal: "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue 
must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority." Brookside Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v. Peebles. 2002 UT 48, 
114,48 P.3d 96S, 912 (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 
1998)). The mere assertion of an issue is not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. 
As previously explained by this Court, "[f|or an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if 
indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge 
can consider it." LeBaron & Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises. Inc.. 823 P.2d 479, 
483 (Utah App. 1991). 
In its opening brief, Dormer Crest has asserted for the first time that the Planning 
Commission's grant of a planned unit development to Van Cott was illegal in that the 
Van Cott property is not a proper candidate for a PUD and that the PUD statute, at least 
as applied to the facts of this case, is illegal. Although, Dormer Crest contends that the 
issue of the "legality of the Planning Commission's grant of a planned development 
6 
conditional use permit was extensively argued in the summary judgment briefing below," 
the issue of the Van Cott property being a proper candidate and the legality of the entire 
PUD concept was never asserted in the trial court. Br. of Appellants p.l. As a review of 
the Record reveals, however, Donner Crest's sole argument in this regard until this 
appeal has been that only the Board of Adjustment has the authority to grant a variance 
from the requirements of the zoning ordinance, which Donner Crest claims this was. See 
R. 324-35. 
A closer reading of Donner Crest's Memorandum opposing summary judgment 
shows that, while it made many arguments, none of the arguments made below contended 
that the Van Cott parcel was not fit for planned development, nor did they address the 
legality of the City's planned development scheme. Before the trial court, Donner Crest 
argued that: 
(a) the Utah Code requires equal treatment of property owners within a zoning 
district, R. 326-27; 
(b) a variance is required to deviate from the standards of the Zoning 
Ordinance, R. 327-29; 
(c) only the Board of Adjustment is allowed to grant a variance from the 
requirements of the Zoning Ordinance, R. 329-30; 
(d) variances may only be granted when specific findings are made, R. 330-32; 
and 
(e) the City's attempt to empower the Planning Commission to grant variances 
from the Zoning Ordinance is illegal, R. 332-35. 
Donner Crest did not argue before the trial court that the Planning Commission's 
grant of a conditional use permit was illegal. Rather, it focused its efforts on labeling the 
Van Cott planned development conditional use permit a variance. A court should not 
pass on issues argued for the first time on appeal. Donner Crest's principal arguments on 
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appeal, including that the Van Cott project is not a PUD candidate, and that the City's 
PUD provision is illegal, were never even presented to the trial court. This Court should 
not allow Dormer Crest to avoid the requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and years of case law by proposing new arguments for the first time on appeal. Neither 
of these arguments were raised in a timely manner to the district court. As such, this 
Court should not entertain Dormer Crest's new arguments for the first time, but should 
affirm the decision of the district court. 
B. THE STATE ACT GRANTS MUNICIPALITIES BROAD POWER TO 
ZONE AND TO REGULATE LAND USES. 
The actions of the Planning Commission in approving the Van Cott planned 
development application was proper in all respects and was done pursuant to statutorily 
granted powers. In spite of Donner Crest's continued insistence that Van Cott obtained 
an illegal variance from the requirements of the zoning ordinance, the Planning 
Commission granted no variance. Rather, what it did grant to Van Cott was a conditional 
use permit for a planned development, in accordance with the procedures mandated by 
the Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act (the "State Act" or "Act"), 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-101, et seq., and the Salt Lake City ordinances. 
The Act grants a municipality broad authority to enact a comprehensive zoning 
scheme and to regulate land uses. Section 10-9-102 provides the purpose statement of 
the Act: 
To accomplish the purpose of this chapter, and in order to provide 
for the health, safety, and welfare, and promote the prosperity, 
improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, convenience, 
and aesthetics of the municipality and its present and future 
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inhabitants and businesses, to protect the tax base, secure economy 
in governmental expenditures, foster the state's agricultural and other 
industries, protect both urban and nonurban development, and to 
protect property values, municipalities may enact all ordinances, 
resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use and 
development of land within the municipality, including ordinances, 
resolutions, and rules governing uses, density, open spaces, 
structures, buildings, energy efficiency, light and air, air quality, 
transportation and public or alternative transportation, infrastructure, 
public facilities, vegetation, and trees and landscaping, unless those 
ordinances, resolutions, or rules are expressly prohibited by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-102 (emphasis added). The Legislature allowed for any and all 
enactments considered necessary by a municipality, as long as they are not expressly 
prohibited by the Act. This broad power granted to the City Council further evidences 
the Legislature's intent that municipalities be empowered to make land use decisions 
which the municipality considers necessary. 
The Act further permits a municipality to "enact a zoning ordinance establishing 
regulations for land use and development that furthers the intent o f the Act. Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9-401. In furtherance of a municipality's zoning ordinance, its "legislative 
body may amend: (i) the number, shape, boundaries, or area of any zoning district; (ii) 
any regulation of or within the zoning district; or (iii) any other provision of the zoning 
ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-403 (l)(a) (emphasis added). Finally, "[a] zoning 
ordinance may contain provisions for conditional uses that may be allowed, allowed with 
conditions, or denied in designated zoning districts, based on compliance with standards 
and criteria set forth in the zoning ordinance for those uses." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
407(1). Thus, the Act foresees that a municipality will from time to time need to amend 
regulations within zoning districts, as well as the zoning ordinance itself. 
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In accordance with these grants of authority, the City Council did provide for 
conditional uses in its comprehensive zoning plan. "A conditional use is a use which has 
potential adverse impacts upon the immediate neighborhood and the City as a whole." 
S.L.C. Code § 21 A.54.010. Further, the City Council provided for planned developments 
as a conditional use. "A planned development is a distinct category of conditional use. 
As such, it is intended to encourage the efficient use of land and resources, promoting 
greater efficiency and public and utility services and encouraging innovation in the 
planning and building of all types of development." S.L.C. Code § 21A.54.150(A). 
In furtherance of the broad authority provided under the Act, and specific grants of 
authority, the Salt Lake City Council also provided for a planning commission. "Each 
municipality may enact an ordinance establishing a planning commission." Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9-201. The Salt Lake City Planning Commission was established pursuant to 
this grant. See S.L.C. Code § 2.20.010, et seq.; see also S.L.C. Code § 21A.06.030. 
"The planning commission shal l . . . administer provisions of the zoning ordinance, 
where specifically provided for in the zoning ordinance adopted by the legislative body . . 
. [and] exercise any other powers: (a) that are necessary to enable it to perform its 
function; or (b) delegated to it by the legislative body" Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-204(3), 
(8) (emphasis added). The Act clearly enables a municipality to establish a planning 
commission, and to delegate to that Commission very broad power and authority, as the 
City Council determines and delegates. 
As part of the creation of the Planning Commission, the City Council empowered 
the Planning Commission and gave it jurisdiction and authority to "review, hear and 
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decide applications for conditional uses, including planned developments, pursuant to the 
procedures and standards set forth in Part V, Chapter 21A.54, Conditional Uses." S.L.C. 
Code § 21A.06.030(B)(5). In addition, the City Council specifically granted the authority 
to the Planning Commission to modify regulations with respect to planned developments. 
"In approving any planned development, the planning commission may change, alter, 
modify or waive any provision of this title or of the City's subdivision regulations as they 
apply to the proposed planned development." S.L.C. Code § 21A.54.150(C) (emphasis 
added.) 
Pursuant to this statutory scheme, the Planning Commission considered and 
approved the Van Cott application for a planned development covering the subject 
property. Pursuant to the Zoning Ordinance, Van Cott submitted its application for a 
planned development on its property. (R. 16.) The Planning Commission's staff then 
reviewed the Van Cott application and made its recommendation to the Planning 
Commission for approval. (R. 205-16.) As required by S.L.C. Code § 21A.54.150, the 
Planning Commission made the specific requisite findings in approving the Van Cott 
application for a planned development. (R. 288-90.) The Planning Commission made 
the following findings: 
Findings - Standards for Conditional Use 
1. A Planned Development is allowed as a Conditional Use in this 
zone. 
2. The proposed development is in harmony with the general purposes 
and intent of the Standards for Conditional Use and is compatible 
with and implements the planning goals and objectives of the City, 
including applicable City master plans. It is not impossible from a 
geological standpoint or of a geologic concern to build on this slope 
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and, in fact, it is found that the development, if built as engineered 
by Bill Gordon, will increase the geologic stability of a portion of 
the area. 
3. Streets or other means of access to the proposed development are 
suitable and adequate to carry anticipated traffic and will not 
materially degrade the service level on the adjacent streets. 
4. The internal circulation system of the proposed development is 
properly designed. The visitor parking stalls shall be increased to 
three for this six-unit development. 
5. Existing and proposed utilities are or will be adequate for the 
proposed development and will not have an adverse impact to 
adjacent land uses or resources. 
6. Appropriate buffering is provided to protect adjacent land uses from 
light, noise, and visual impacts, and responsibility will be delegated 
to the Planning Director to assure that the necessary buffering 
occurs. 
7. Architecture and building materials are consistent with the 
development and compatible with the adjacent neighborhood, and 
responsibility will be delegated to the Planning Director to work 
with the architect to assure that materials are compatible. 
8. Landscaping is appropriate for the scale of the development, and 
responsibility will be delegated to the Planning Director to assure 
that it is appropriate. 
9. The proposed development is compatible with the surrounding 
neighborhood and will not have a material net cumulative adverse 
impact on the neighborhood or the City as a whole. 
10. The proposed development complies with all other applicable codes 
and ordinances. 
Findings - Planned Development 
The Planning Commission finds that the following standards of the Planned 
Development section of the Zoning Ordinance will be met: 
1. Creation of a more desirable environment than would be possible 
through strict application of the other City land use regulations. 
2. Promotion of a creative approach to the use of land and related 
physical facilities resulting in better design and development, 
including aesthetic amenities. 
3. Combination and coordination of architectural styles, building 
forms, and building relationships. 
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4. Preservation and enhancement of desirable site characteristics such 
as natural topography, vegetation and geologic features, and the 
prevention of soil erosion. 
5. Use of design, landscape or architectural features to create a pleasing 
environment. 
6. Inclusion of special development amenities. 
(R. 288-90.) 
As part of the approval process for Van Cott's planned development application, 
the Planning Commission addressed the need to change, alter, modify or waive the street 
frontage requirement imposed within this zoning district. The Planning Commission 
made the specific findings required of S.L.C. Code § 21A.54.150(C): "No such change, 
alteration, modification or waiver shall be approved unless the Planning Commission 
shall find that the proposed planned development: 1. Will achieve the purposes for which 
a planned development may be approved pursuant to subsection A of this section; and 2. 
Will not violate the general purposes, goals and objectives of this title and of any plans 
adopted by the planning commission or the city council." Id. As set forth above, the 
findings regarding Subsection A were discussed in the Planning Commission Staff 
Report and adopted by the Planning Commission. (R. 215-16,288-90.) With respect to 
the second necessary finding that approval will not violate the general purposes, goals 
and objectives of this Title and of any plans adopted by the Planning Commission or the 
City Council, the Planning Commission plainly made these findings as well: "The 
proposed development is in harmony with the general purposes and intent of the 
Standards for Conditional Uses and is compatible with and implements the planning 
goals of the City, including applicable City master plans." (R. 288-89.) 
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Moreover, the Van Cott property plainly falls within the definition of a planned 
development under the Salt Lake City Ordinance. Although Donner Crest argues that 
"by no stretch of the imagination is the Van Cott Property even a valid candidate for a 
PUD," Donner Crest has no direct authority for its position. Br. of Appellant p. 30. 
Instead, they explain that PUDs are "on acreage of certain minimum size, usually large 
enough to constitute a new community." Br. of Appellants at 30-31 (citing Saunders v. 
Sharp. 793 P.2d 927,928 n.2 (Utah App. 1990)). Donner Crest attempts to mount this 
argument based on citation to a footnote in one case1 and one phrase in a treatise. 
But without needing to look further, the Salt Lake City Zoning Ordinance 
specifically allows for a planned development to be built in the RMF-45 district on a 
parcel as small as twenty thousand (20,000) square feet. S.L.C. Code § 21A.54.150, 
Table E2, available at Br. of Appellants, App. - 1 , pp. 10-11. The Van Cott parcel is 
approximately 1.2 acres, more than twice the minimum required area for a planned 
development in the RMF-45 district.2 (R. 2). Accordingly, the Van Cott parcel is, by 
statute, sufficiently large to accommodate a planned development in the district. 
Finally, Donner Crest attempts to argue that, in essence, the Planning 
Commission's approval of the Van Cott planned development is illegal spot zoning. Spot 
zoning, as defined by the Zoning Ordinance, is "the process of singling out a small parcel 
1
 In fact, the footnote cited by Donner Crest gives a Vermont court's 23-year-old 
definition of planned unit development. See Saunders, 793 P.2d at 929 n.2 (citing 
Stevens v. Essex Junction Zoning Bd., 428 A.2d 1100,1103 (Vt. 1981)). 
2
 An acre is widely understood to be "[a]n area of land measuring 43,560 square feet." 
Black's Law Dictionary 24 (7th Ed. 1999). As such, Van Cott's 1.2 acre parcel would 
measure approximately 52,272 square feet. 
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of land for a use classification materially different and inconsistent with the surrounding 
area and the adopted city master plan, for the sole benefit of the owner of that property 
and to the detriment of the rights of other property owners." S.L.C. Code § 21 A.62.040 
(emphasis added). The Van Cott Parcel does not qualify within the Zoning Ordinance's 
definition of spot zoning. As defined by Utah courts: 
Spot zoning results in the creation of two types of "islands." One 
type results when the zoning authority improperly limits the use 
which may be made of a small parcel located in the center of an 
unrestricted area. The second type of "island" results when most of 
a large district is devoted to a limited or restricted use, but additional 
uses are permitted in one or more spots in the district. 
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 
1151 (Utah 1976) (citing Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino. 175 P.2d 542 (Cal. 1946)). 
Presumably, Dormer Crest argues that the second type of "island" was granted to Van 
Cott. In either case, the plain reality is that neither "island" was created in this case. Van 
Cott's proposed project is a multi-family planned development, located in a multi-family 
district. Its uses is identical to the surrounding uses. No spot zoning has occurred in this 
case. 
It appears that not only Van Cott and the Planning Commission, but also the 
authors of the leading Utah real property law treatise, cited by Dormer Crest, understand 
the planned development process to allow a planning commission to modify the 
requirements of the zoning ordinance. As explained by Professors Thomas and 
Backman, "[i]f a PUD proposal is accepted by the local planning commission, greater 
creativity in development is possible since the housing project will not be bound by the 
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requirements contained in the subdivision ordinances." David A. Thomas & James H. 
Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law. § 4.04(a), p. 173 (1999). 
And this is exactly what happened here. Van Cott, understanding that the unique 
features of its parcel would require creativity to develop, sought approval from the 
Planning Commission for a planned development conditional use permit, in accordance 
with the requirements and procedures of the Zoning Ordinance. The Planning 
Commission found the proposal acceptable, and approved Van Cott's application. 
The Planning Commission did not merely waive the frontage requirement for the 
Van Cott parcel. It made its approval of the project conditional on compliance by Van 
Cott with many requirements which otherwise would not have been imposed: 
(1) Compliance with all departmental comments and the recommendations; 
(2) Compliance with the geotechnical report as submitted by AMEC Earth & 
Environmental, Inc., dated September 28, 2001, including additional pre-
construction testing as recommended; 
(3) That a detailed landscape plan be submitted to the Planning Department 
outlining the areas of vegetation preservation, delegating final approval to 
the Planning Director, with special emphasis on creating buffering for the 
neighboring projects, especially the pool area; 
(4) That final plat and development approval authority be granted to the 
Planning Director; 
(5) Future Administrative consideration for condominium approval; 
(6) Consistent with the plans of the contractor, no staging be allowed in the 
[Dormer] circle area; 
(7) Approval is subject to the opinion of the City Attorney that the lot is a 
legally subdivided lot or, in the alternative, that before the applicant can 
build, they must obtain appropriate subdivision and platting approval;3 
(8) That a snow removal plan be submitted that will not impinge upon 
adjoining properties or the natural habitat or the natural stream channel, nor 
require exporting snow off the property; 
3
 Note that the City Attorney did issue an opinion letter on August 8, 2002, stating that 
the lot is legally subdivided. R. 37-38. 
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(9) That on site visitor parking stalls be increased to three stalls for this six unit 
development; 
(10) Architecture and building materials must be compatible with the adjacent 
neighborhood and the Planning Commission delegates responsibility to the 
Planning Director to assure that the design and materials are compatible; 
and 
(11) This project must be designed and built as engineered by Bill Gordon and 
as described in the hearing by Chuck Culp. 
(R. 290.) Clearly, the Van Cott project was subjected to the rigors of Planning 
Commission review. Its planned development conditional use permit was approved, but 
approval was made contingent upon compliance with all of the above-listed requirements. 
The Planning Commission acted pursuant to powers delegated to it by the City 
Council in approving the Van Cott planned development application, which included a 
waiver of the frontage requirement. Salt Lake City delegated that power to the Planning 
Commission to make that decision pursuant to the Act. The Planning Commission 
lawfully acted within its properly delegated powers and granted the Van Cott planned 
development application in accordance with state law and Salt Lake City ordinances. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Planning Commission, the Land Use Appeals board and 
the Third Judicial District Court should be upheld by this Court. Donner Crest's appeal 
should be denied and the decisions below affirmed. 
C. VAN COTT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A VARIANCE FROM 
THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT. 
Van Cott was not required to obtain a variance from the Board of Adjustment for 
approval of its planned development which did not have the frontage requirement 
otherwise applicable in that zoning district. As set forth above, a planned development is 
part of the comprehensive zoning ordinance passed by Salt Lake City. The planned 
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development is specifically provided for in the zoning ordinance. A conditional use is 
not outside of the zoning ordinance - it is an express part of the zoning ordinance. The 
planned development application submitted by Van Cott made application pursuant to the 
specific zoning provisions allowing for a planned development. Again, and as set forth 
above, the Planning Commission specifically followed and approved the application in 
accordance with the state Act and the Salt Lake City zoning ordinances. 
A variance, on the other hand, specifically contemplates a waiver of or 
modification of an enacted zoning ordinance: 
Any person or entity desiring a waiver or a modification of the 
requirements of the zoning ordinances applied to a parcel of property 
owned, leases, or in which he holds some other beneficial interest 
may apply to the Board of Adjustment for a variance from the terms 
of the zoning ordinance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707. The specific purpose of the variance is to allow something 
which is not authorized by the comprehensive zoning ordinance. Id. For example, had 
Van Cott not proceeded as a planned development, Van Cott would have had to apply for 
a variance in order to gain development approval. Because the planned development 
ordinance specifically allowed for a waiver of the frontage requirement as part of the 
planned development statutory scheme, no variance of the frontage requirement was 
required. In essence, the frontage requirement was written out of the zoning 
requirements for the Van Cott planned development project. As argued above, the City 
Council had the authority to and did grant to the Planning Commission the authority and 
powers to amend or modify the zoning ordinances for any particular planned 
development, provided specific findings were made. Because the specific findings were 
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made, the frontage requirement no longer applied to the Van Cott planned development 
and, thus, no variance was required. 
Van Cott applied for a use specifically authorized by the zoning code. Van Cott 
did not seek to circumvent the requirements of the zoning ordinance and, as such, a 
variance plainly was not the proper avenue to seek approval of the proposed 
development. Because a planned development specifically allowed the Van Cott 
development as proposed and the Planning Commission had the authority to review, hear 
and decide an application for a planned development, the granting of that conditional use 
by the Planning Commission was proper as a matter of law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District Court affirming the decision 
of the Land Use Appeals Board affirming the decision of the Planning Commission 
should be affirmed by this Court. The Planning Commission acted within its statutorily 
granted powers in approving the Van Cott planned development application. The 
Planning Commission made the requisite findings in approving the Van Cott application 
for a planned development. Because Van Cott did not seek to circumvent the Zoning 
Ordinances, Van Cott did not need to seek a variance. Consequently, this Court should 
affirm. 
Because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and 
record; because the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument; 
and because the arguments raised by Donner Crest do not merit significant additional 
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time and resources spent by this Court and the litigants, Van Cott respectfully submits 
that this case should be decided on the briefs without the need for a hearing.4 
DATED this /*/ •"day of September, 2004. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Robert E. Mansfield 
Stephen K. Christiansen 
Attorneys for Appellees 
See Utah R. App. 29(a). 
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